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ROTFL That's hypereutectic pistons . . . they're just cheap, old cast pistons with a higher silicon content in the aluminum alloy. The best things about them is that they're super-cheap to make and you can run'em with tight wall clearances because they don't expand as much as a proper forging. But they have the lifespan of an ice-cube in Death Valley if overreved or subjected to anything other than perfect combustion conditions or even high cylinder pressures/heat from forced induction. Then they just become BLOCK VENTILATING PISTONS . . . . While poor tuning can trash even the best pistion, hypereutectics allow no margin for error. Just ask any 1996-2001 Cobra owner who became too greedy with the boost . . . .

Actually, the blogger's points were reasonable in that the gaps between the variants seem excessive and Team Mustang has offered almost nothing of interest to young "tuners" and "drifters" who want something less than a V8 (ever try to insure one if you're under 25) and aren't too moved by the chunky "retro" front bumper styling. Compared to 1969, there is less variety now. That's probably a good thing because of the costs of option proliferation and emissions certification and the dramatically-reduced sales volume. But some of us can't help but wonder whether a tuner-oriented turbo 4 or turbo/supercharged V6 (similar in concept to the old SVO Mustang) and a real gap filler between the 300 h.p. GT and the virtually unobtainable $60,000+ GT500 might not be "better ideas." Of course, "decal cars" like the Shelby GT and more serious efforts like the rumored "Boss"/GT350 may help fill the gap someday (hopefully the Boss--or whatever it's called-- will revive and update the Terminator engine). I've also read on some sites and in magazines that some want a return of the V8 LX or GTS (V8 power but without all the unnecesary and weight-bloating, non-performance frills). And I've argued for an optional, lower-compression H.D. engine with forged internals and maybe with the DOHC heads. We all love the Mustang, but with Camaro and Challenger coming, they've got to aggressively keep developing it. I think we should all try to be nicer. I admit that I've wrote things here that I shouldn't have (like when I called Richard Jensen a "chump" because of his unnecessary sarcasm based on what seemed to me as an uninformed position) Name calling generally never advances an argument.

Tell us how you REALLY FEEL. I suspect that both of you have too much time on your hands.

I noticed in reviewing bookmarked Ford blogs a "debate" involving frequent forum poster "Zanatwork" Interesting reading. The truth probably lies somewhere in the middle. Debate over Bill Ford's responsibility for Ford's current problems.

Why shouldn't they know about BOTH? I expect top executives to be intimately familar with all of the competition's products AND how customers actually use OUR products . . . . Of course, does Ford really offer anything competitive with Mulally's Lexus? Not in any of its domestic brands . . . .

I you live in an emissions-testing state (such as California), you'd better show up with something under the hood that at least remotely resembles the factory mill. Not even the dumbest inspector would mistake a 5.0 or Windsor for a Modular. The great loopholes are "exemption order" parts (such as many centrifugal superchargers) and retrofitting with an emissions-legal factory-style unit (such as an '03-'04 SVT Cobra engine). FRPP hasn't exactly made any of this cheap, convenient or easy for anyone.

That's one way of looking at it. But Ford, for the time being, is in the vehicle business, not the "Way Forward" cost-cutting business. If the man at the top lacks sufficient understanding and vision as to the very thing that generates substantially the bulk of Ford's revenue--manufacturing and selling new vehicles--how is he going to meaningfully contribute to the "decisions" as to what parts of Ford are fat for trimming . . . or which are muscle or bone? Sure, he could just blindly rely on what the Glass House gang feeds him on "product" and hope for the best . . . but isn't that part of what got Bill Ford into trouble? Fields may prove to be a brilliant product man and a cagey labor negotiator, but that doesn't absolve Mulally from the responsibility to understand for himself the essentials of Ford's business. And Ford's business is PRODUCT, PRODUCT, PRODUCT! (everything else are just instrumentalities feeding and sustaining the product machine)

True, FRPP has supported the 5.0 and the Windsor somewhat. But the catalog is still packed with too many two-bolt main blocks, cast cranks and hypereutectic-piston crate engines. In fact, Ford doesn't sell one supercharger-ready crate engine, Windsor or otherwise, despite that the staging lanes and show fields at Ford events are literally PACKED with poweradder SBFs. (Query: Without a poweradder, how do you stand a chance running a 4.6-5.4 liter engine against the 5.7-8.3 liter engines of the competition?) And most of the really good stuff for the SBF isn't in the FRPP wishbook. Admittedly, the basic hard parts are there for small block pushrod engine builders (unless you want to build a Boss/Cleveland at less than the Nextel Cup level), even if Ford's crate motor program is as lame as a three-legged Grayhound and as clueless as Rosie O'Donnell on "The View." Still, given that it's illegal for on-road use in most venues to swap in a 5.0 or Windsor into a 1996 or newer Ford, FRPP's neglect of the Modular program seems signficant and short-sighted. Of course none of this is a new problem: How Ford lost hegemony in the performance market Zora Arkus-Duntov's manifesto on how to beat Ford

You mean "data gathering" methods such as the ones which led to the 1958 Edsel? Ford already has a "data gathering" system. One which apparently misled Bill Ford throughout his five years of flip-flops, near misses and failure. And Bill had a whole career in the industry (not to mention all the first-hand anecdotes shared at Ford family affairs) to get ready for it. So he should have been able to anticipate the flaws and conceive of a plan to minimize them. Of course, you believe Detroit's messiahs will come from non-automotive sources (a conclusion, btw, not completely shared by Peter Brown of the Automotive News: "But you have to worry. Consider the history of outsiders coming into major positions at automakers. Think Ron Zarrella at General Motors. Consider the fate of most outside executives, even those with automotive experience, who have joined Ford Motor Co. Think Bunkie Knudsen. Think a slew of executives hired from outside by Jacques Nasser. . . . Ford is a notoriously nasty place for outsiders. High-level outsiders are seen to have stolen a job that rightfully belongs to a Ford lifer. The knives will be out. . . . Nobody from outside the auto industry has successfully taken over an [u.S.] automaker since the early days of the U.S. auto industry." ) So it would be incumbent upon and prudent for Mulally to "educate himself" first-hand, so that he's got some basis to accept or to question the "data" generated by the Ford bureaucracy. Getting out in the field without too many "handlers" is merely a reasonable strategy toward that objective.

I edited it to clarify that it was NOT a concrete "fact" BTW, an opinion is, by nature "opinionated." And you're certainly entitled to your opinion. But the statement "Doron Levin writes what most knowledgable followers of Ford are thinking about the CEO hire" reflects a broad cross-section of what people who know about this industry ARE saying in various venues, other than perhaps the little Bill Ford "Amen" corner that is this site.

Bolita: "If he is as down to earth as it seems (taking 30 minutes for a kid at Boeing) he could easily spend a few hours at different dealerships to really understand whats going on from the consumer point of view..." Jensen: "I think that's the one thing he doesn't need to do. The man's sole connection to the car industry for the last 40 years has been as a consumer." Zan, what would be the reasonable inference? It seems that Jensen believes Mulally doesn't need to talk with customers or "spend a few hours at different dealerships." After all, I'm certain that some brass hat Boeing Veep buying an $80,000 Lexus in Seattle creates a "universal" customer perspective applicable thoughout Ford's thousands of dealerships nationwide. Jensen, of course, skirts the issue by referring to "smart questions" of the "right customers" and disclaiming that forty years of consumin' yields all the answers. But he doesn't really explain how Mulally will meet the "right customers" or get anything of value from them. The implication is Mulally, in Jensen's world, will wedge in a few pre-aranged "focus groups" (e.g. orchestrated dog-n-pony shows often calculated to CY someone's A, in my experience) or high-level executive pow-wows with the "right" customers (often involving drinks and golf trips, and leading to plenty of sucking-up behaviors) or perhaps a carefully choreographed "road show" of "state visits" (to borrow Tom Peters's sarcastic phrase for these overly-structured executive field trips which are nothing more than "showing the flag" to the troops and insulating the boss from harsh or unpleasant realities). None of the foregoing tend to yield accurate, unfiltered information. Random, first hand sampling, however, could be a valuable augment to more scientific approaches--most certainly for someone who hasn't really thought much about unique automotive issues.

I'm fully aware that you don't agree that the hypereutectic pistions and the cheapskate rods are liabilities in the "base" Mustang GT. (and I know you'll cite that even the Corvette LS7 runs hypereutectics) But I'd be willing to bet if you polled the readership of the various hot rodding and Mustang magazines, an overwhelming majority of readers would have either given up some features or paid a little extra for the possibility of a forged-piston engine in Mustang GT. The fact that Ford didn't recognize how a significant number of their customers planned to use their cars evidences that the decision makers were sadly out of touch or just didn't care (And btw, more than a few people DO use Mustangs to whip on WRXs and Evos and Supras and Corvettes! (it's not like Ford's USA customers have any real Ford-branded alternative)) What's more, going too cheap on the internals (or other parts, such as the door-stop cylinder heads on the 1996-1998 GT) is a gift that keeps on giving. It hurts residual values because it dampens demand. And as with any significant quality gaffe, it also gives entry-level Ford owners (i.e. potential future new Ford customers) a bad taste for the brand. After all, when you blow up your engine trying to keep up with somebody in a $5,000 Camaro or you get regularly smoked by some Japanese tuner car, you don't really care that Ford saved $100/unit and that some bureaucrat won a cost-cutting award for it. Instead, too many will switch rather than spend all the extra money to finish the job Ford should have done in the first place. The sad thing is that Team Mustang apparently still doesn't get it. But for many of us, this has been obvious for decades. And the fact that 300 was the bogie in 2002-03, when GM was already at that level (with better fuel economy to boot) speaks volumes about Ford's "super-conservative mentality."

This doesn't prove that the hypereutectics aren't on the edge. Moreover, anyone who has read Richard Holdener's dyno test book on the Modular V8 is aware that, but for the weak factory pistons and rods, the Modular is capable of quite a bit more power in "power adder" applications (a simple 2V turbo can make as much as 750 h.p. on gasoline and 4V engines have been tested in excess of 900 h.p.). The unvarnished truth is that notwithstanding Ford's nearly 15-year production of variants of the Modular V8, it has not really caught on as a performance powerplant. On the other hand, GM's larger but more basic 2V LSx engines have exploded in popularity over the past eight years, even though GM has been without a "pony" car for much of that time. Although there are a number of factors contributing to this, part of the problem is that Ford has been too cheap with the necessary OEM hardware and has almost totally dropped the ball on modular crate engines and affordable over-the-counter parts for Modular V8s.

I've been a shopper at Wal-Mart for decades. So under your standard, that qualifies me to be Wal-Mart's CEO (assuming I've got the other "universal" executive skills honed in a marginally similar industry) I mean, I know all about "discount retailing" from a customer perspective . . . . The fact that the guy bought a boring appliance car and probably can drive himself around in it doesn't give him a pass on listening to Ford's dealers and customers to gain a BROADER PERSPECTIVE ON THE MARKET!

most -- adj. Constituting or forming a large number; numerous: many. —Synonyms: multifarious, multitudinous, myriad; divers, sundry, various. many, innumerable, manifold, numerous. knowledgeable--adj 1: highly educated; having extensive information or understanding; "an enlightened public"; "knowing instructors"; "a knowledgeable critic"; "a knowledgeable audience" [syn: enlightened, knowing, learned, lettered, well-educated, well-read] 2: thoroughly acquainted with and skilled in something through study or experience; "well versed in classical languages" [syn: versed] [ant: unversed] 3: alert and fully informed; "politically aware"; "a knowing collector of rare books"; "the most...technically aware of the novelists under thirty"- W.S.Graham; "surprisingly knowledgeable about what was going on" [syn: aware(p), knowing] 4: thoroughly acquainted with through study or experience; "this girl, so intimate with nature"-W.H.Hudson; "knowledgeaIble about the technique of painting"- Herbert Read [syn: intimate, intimate with, knowledgeable about(p)] Given that these adjectives in combination clearly suggest a conclusion based on subjective and objective factors (obviously there are no scientific polls or even recognized tests to determine the number or knowledge level of those following the Mulally hire), the statement you object to as "vague" was obviously a conclusion based on opinion and NOT a concrete "fact." [oops, I left out the "not" in the first draft] However, given that Levin's opinions have been reprised in various fora (including this one) by a number of others, the obvious opinion stated in the hyperlink is not unreasonable or indefensible.

Um, Ed, you're in essence making my point. Why would I want to spend $25,000-$30,000 on a new Mustang and then spend another $8-10 grand on it (supercharger + rebuilding the brand new shortblock) just so I don't get smoked by somebody in a mildly tuned-up GM LSx or a tuner with a mildly tweaked WRX or EVO? Why would I want to play Russian Roulette with a low-boost hypereutectic set-up if the solution by Ford was known, easy and cheap? If Ford added the good forged pistons and rods for me when building the engine in the first place (like they used to do with the 5.0), it would only add a few dollars to the cost of the car (far, far cheaper than a total engine overhaul). Given that everyone admits Mustang has an exclusive niche at the moment, adding a few dollars for an optional H.D. engine or beefing the standard engine to reliably withstand how thousands of owners will use their cars doesn't seem to have much of a downside. (I understand that emissions is a little tougher with forged pistons, but many manufacturers get forged piston engines through the EPA, including Ford ('03-'04 Cobra, GT, GT500). And forged slugs are a touch noiser at cold start, but don't a significant number of Mustang GT owners crank up the stereo and/or install noisy "Flowmasters" on or before "Day2?" Nobody complained about minor piston slap noise in the 5.0)

Why did he have to say anything on the topic at all? Actively misleading investors and the public under the guise of protecting negotiations is a far different thing than merely having "no comment."

There's nothing vague about it. Not every follower of this Ford drama is "knowledgeable" See, e.g. www.blueovalforums.com Not every follower of this Ford drama agrees with Levin. See, supra. But in my opinion, based upon reading a fair amount of commentary, "most" of the "knowledgable" followers of this incident ARE thinking along the lines of what Levin opined. Just because you disagree with an opinion summarily expressed in a one-sentence headline doesn't make it "vague."

Begging the question: how will he know if they "know" without knowing something about what they're talking about? Driving a boringly antiseptic Lexus LS430 around Seattle and supervising development of a carbon-fiber airliner doesn't exactly transfer to understanding why someone buys a 7,000-lb turbodiesel pickup or a 500 horsepower sports car, or a RWD sports sedan, or a hybrid SUV, and what sorts of things will attract them or keep each them coming back to Ford. A nice campaign statement that any "smart CEO" would spew at the start of a new relationship (I've heard plenty of this "feel good" rhetoric in my day). Sure, interpersonal skills, identification of "stars," and team-building are essential to Mulally's success. But as CEO (or even COO, depending on how much leash Bill Ford gives him) he will need to be one of the "final authorities" charting the direction of Ford's product side. Much of this work will be indirectly through getting the right people in the right places with the right resources for success, and by ratifying their decisions. But it's overly simplistic to reduce the CEO position down to "finding and freeing talent." Somebody has to referee the disputes--even technical ones-- that rise to the top. Someone has to make the tough calls on strategy (hopefully we've seen the end of "consensus management") and to "evangelize" new Bold Moves before the board. One would hope Mulally engages in those activities as well. Written as a true "car guy" hater. Of course there aren't very many who deserve to be at the top of most professions. That such people are in short supply in no way indicts the concept. How does that track with the "all-you-need-to-know-about-the-car-"bidness"-you-learned-as-a-Lexus-customer" theory? Obviously, the people Mulally will go to -- who are ALREADY AT FORD (they have all the "talent" they need, remember) -- will all have records of experience in the automobile business or in a relevant technical discipline. He won't be recruiting from www.blueovalnews.com, the blogosphere, the automotive press, or Detroit-area watering holes! So the critical question is whether Mulally's specific experiences provide him a sufficient frame-of-reference to properly evaluate these folks and their work product (past, present and proposed) on objective and subjective bases. If he doesn't, all the "BS detectors" in the world won't save him from being snowed by a sophisticated con-man using the superior knowledge and buzzwords of an insider. Isn't Hau a "car guy?" (albeit a somewhat conservative one) Wrong. It simply recognizes that people who dedicate their lives to being accounting and "universal" business process wonks generally lack the technical and "real world" perspective to fully view and appreciate complex systems and technological problems beyond spreadsheets, cost reports, ratios, financial statements and other numerical data. Such folks often fail to appreciate long-term investments in intangible concepts and messy, imprecise or risky outcomes, unless it can be reduced into an accounting formula. After all, bean counters decided it would be better on a cost/benefit basis to pay a few judgments rather than adequately protect Ford Pinto's fuel tank. In retrospect, that was not only a very poor business decision but a morally horrifying one. Bean counters are like lawyers and other personal service professionals. They keep you in the game by playing an essential role, but they seldom have sufficient grasp of the "big picture" or the critical technical nuances therein, to run the whole shebang. (To illustrate, it's sort of like how I can't seem to explain to you why the high performance, muscle car and "tuner" niche markets view cast hypereutectic pistons as crap in a purported "tunable" performance car, because you lack sufficient technical understanding of what I'm talking about or independent knowledge of these niches, thereby clouding your view of the "big picture.") BTW, there are plenty of poor decision makers who aren't bean counters (most guys are married to one). And plenty of "car guys" have no business running the corner filling station, much less a Fortune 5 corporation. Still, the idea of the "universal" manager simply doesn't track with reality. As I said before, BS detection is highly dependent on one's frame-of-reference.

And that paragraph made my "BS detector" go off. A manager in a technical manufacturing/marketing concern doesn't know how to filter out the BS unless he's got some independent knowledge of engineering and market realities, as well as a firm grounding in the relevant technical processes, and a customer-driven perspective on ultimate outcomes. Such "education" comes only from relevant experiences (academic, professional and informal). That is why "bean counters" make poor decision makers, notwithstanding all their numerical reports and reams of empirical data. At least when FoMoCo's products obviously don't measure up to world-class standards (e.g. the 3.5 Duratec vs. the latest Nissan 3.5 VQ) or there are mistakes and delays in design, engineering or manufacturing, Mulally ought to have sufficient engineering background to see through the excuses. That being said, milestone automobiles don't come from the minds of BS-detecting bureaucrats, budget-slashers, or penny-pinching accountants. They come from creative "car guys" who can master the integration of "hard data" with affective "gut instincts." They come from people with vision and the ability to marshal complexity toward a clearly-defined outcome. On the other hand, it's doubtful that he will be qualified by his experiences to ride herd over marketing, advertising, product promotion, brand "DNA" or motorsports concerns. If he lacks basic knowledge in these areas, how would he be able to sift the "wheat from the chaff?" BS detection is hardly a "universal skill." It is highly dependent on one's frame-of-reference

Doron Levin writes what most knowledgable followers of Ford are thinking about the CEO hire. "Bill Ford is the latest of a breed of Detroit auto executive not quite in touch with consumers. Boomers like me loved Mustangs and Camaros, but our children favor Civics and Pathfinders. After relieving Jacques Nasser as chief executive in late 2001, Ford spent five years learning what many already suspected -- that a Ford family scion isn't necessarily well-suited to operate Ford Motor or to fix its many shortcomings. . . . My hunch is that the Ford family, some of whose members rely on dividends from Ford stock for their income, and the company's board encouraged him to find a replacement. "

I partially agree with you (see my reply to Richard Jensen in the other thread). Still comparing Delorenzo's piece with "the blogger" suggests the truth is somewhere there.

Of course Bill said all that right in the FREAKIN' MIDDLE of recruiting a new CEO . . . . That doesn't speak very highly for the veracity of Bill Ford, does it? But at least it partially explains why Bill was so free with the media over the week or so before the Mulally announcement.

I partially agree that speedzzter's approach may be naive. Being a CEO is an 18+ hour a day job, even for office hermits. But Bill Ford failed in part because he wasn't close enough to the customers, relied way too much on consensus, and he reportedly got snowed a lot. On the other hand, if the President of the U.S. or U.S. Senators can spend a few months campaigning in the heartland, how would it hurt for Mullally to spend some of his days out in the field and his evenings reading all that crap CEOs have to review. The more insulated CEOs are from the "real world," the more likely they are to start believing the lies and distortions generated by various special interests inside and out of the organization (not to mention the worthless gibberish they pick up from other know-it-all executives on the golf course. Besides, fewer lengthy CYA reports, fewer committee meetings and quicker decisions based on an empowered management structure (disciplined by a Management Committee and a CEO with a bold overall vision and simple benchmarks for success) surely couldn't make things any worse.

See Autoextremist nails it on Mullally http://www.blueovalforums.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=6318